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Strategy Competition Dynamics of Multi-Agent
Systems in the Framework of Evolutionary
Game Theory
Jianlei Zhang , Member, IEEE, and Ming Cao, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—There is the recent boom in investigating the con-1
trol of evolutionary games in multi-agent systems, where personal2
interests and collective interests often conflict. Using evolution-3
ary game theory to study the behaviors of multi-agent systems4
yields an interdisciplinary topic which has received an increasing5
amount of attention. Findings in real-world multi-agent systems6
show that individuals have multiple choices, and this diversity7
shapes the emergence and transmission of strategy, disease, inno-8
vation, and opinion in various social populations. In this sense,9
the simplified theoretical models in previous studies need to10
be enriched, though the difficulty of theoretical analysis may11
increase correspondingly. Here, our objective is to theoretically12
establish a scenario of four strategies, including competition13
among the cooperatives, defection with probabilistic punishment,14
speculation insured by some policy, and loner. And the possible15
results of strategy evolution are analyzed in detail. Depending on16
the initial condition, the state converges either to a domination17
of cooperators, or to a rock-scissors-paper type heteroclinic cycle18
of three strategies.19
Index Terms—Game theory, multi-agent system, evolution20
dynamics.21
I. INTRODUCTION22
THERE is burgeoning study in the networked systems23 and control theory in applications ranging from dis-24
tributed robotics to epidemic control and decision making of25
humans [1]–[3]. When the agents have competing objectives,26
as is often the case, each agent must consider the actions of her27
competitors; in such cases single-objective optimization meth-28
ods fail. Especially, situations in which the private interest can29
be at odds with the public interest constitute an important class30
of societal problems. Evolutionary game theory is an interdis-31
ciplinary mathematical tool which seems to be able to embody32
several relevant features of the problem and, as such, is used33
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in much cooperation-oriented research. In particular, the oft- 34
cited public goods game [4]–[7] is a paradigm example for 35
investigating the emergence of cooperation in spite of the fact 36
that self-interest seems to dictate defective behavior. 37
As a cross-cutting topic, many solutions for this multi- 38
agent cooperative dilemma in multi-agent systems have been 39
discussed [8], [9]. The theory of kin selection focuses on 40
cooperation among individuals that are genetically closely 41
related, whereas theories of direct reciprocity focus on the 42
selfish incentives for cooperation in bilateral long-term inter- 43
actions [10]–[13]. The theories of indirect reciprocity and 44
costly signalling indicate how cooperation in larger groups can 45
emerge when the cooperators can build a reputation [14], [15]. 46
Current research has also highlighted two factors boosting 47
cooperation in public goods interactions, namely, punishment 48
of defectors [16], [17] and the option to abstain from the joint 49
enterprise. Voluntary participation [18] allows individuals to 50
adopt a risk-aversion strategy, termed loner. A loner refuses 51
to participate in unpromising public enterprises and instead 52
relies on a small but fixed payoff. 53
For the multi-agent systems, the individual heterogeneity 54
and biological or social diversity are also well-known phe- 55
nomena in nature [19], [20]. It is intriguing to investigate 56
whether and how biodiversity affects the emergence and trans- 57
mission of strategy, disease, innovation, opinion and so on. 58
The potential difficulties brought by individual heterogene- 59
ity in mathematical modeling, raise challenges for existing 60
theoretical models which only consider relatively simple (in 61
strategy types, decision-making modes, etc) agents in games. 62
However, this is an unavoidable direction and many more stud- 63
ies concerning with the individual heterogeneity or diversity, 64
in the framework evolutionary game theory, are expected to 65
appear in the near future. Only in this way could we gain more 66
insight into a series of perplexing puzzles about cooperative 67
phenomena in the multi-agent systems. 68
In this line of research, based on the punishment in the strat- 69
egy competition [21], [22], our previous work [23] goes a step 70
further by proposing another behavior type named as specula- 71
tion. Results indicate scenarios where speculation either leads 72
to the reduction of the basin of attraction of the cooperative 73
equilibrium or even the loss of stability of this equilibrium, 74
if the costs of the insurance are lower than the expected fines 75
faced by a defector. 76
Further, agents often have multiple choices in decision mak- 77
ing due to the individual personality, especially when facing 78
the potential punishment if defecting. For example, resolute 79
defectors will persist in their defection strategy, though tak- 80
ing the risk of being punished with a probability. Speculators 81
incline to buy an insurance policy covering the costs of 82
punishment when caught defecting. While timid loners will 83
1549-7747 c© 2019 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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conservatively obtain an autarkic income independent of the84
other players’ decision. These mentioned choices can better85
represent the possible attempts to raise money for public goods86
in complicated real-life situations. With this formulation, as an87
extension of our previous work proposing speculation [23], the88
fourth strategy (i.e., loner, a player can refuse to participate89
and get some small but fixed income) is also provided for the90
players. As mentioned, it is based on the assumption that play-91
ers can voluntarily decide whether to participate in the joint92
game or not.93
So altogether we consider four behavior types, which enrich94
the model and meanwhile raise the difficulty of theoretical95
analysis. (a) The cooperators join the group and to contribute96
their effort. (b) The defectors join, but do not contribute; more-97
over, defectors are caught with a certain probability and a fine98
is imposed on them when caught. Here we are less interested99
in the specific establishment of an effective system of pun-100
ishment, but rather in the two additional options (speculation101
and loner) found in several systems. To be more specific,102
we consider the public goods game with an external punish-103
ment system as indicated above. (c) The speculators purchase104
an insurance policy covering the costs of punishment when105
caught defecting. It means that by paying a fixed cost for106
their insurance policy, speculators can defect without paying107
any fine from punishment. (d) The loners are unwilling to join108
the game, but prefer to rely on a small but fixed payoff. By109
means of a theoretical approach, we investigate the joint evo-110
lution of multiple strategies and the stability of the evolving111
system.112
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION113
In a typical public goods game (PGG) played in interaction114
groups of size N, each player receives an endowment c and115
independently decides how much of it to be contributed to a116
public goods system. Then the collected sum is multiplied by117
an amplification factor r (1 < r < N) and is redistributed118
to the group members, irrespective of her strategy. The max-119
imum total benefit will be achieved if all players contribute120
maximally. In this case each player receives rc, thus the final121
payoff is (r − 1)c. Players are faced with the temptation of122
taking advantage of the public goods without contributing. In123
other words, any individual investment is a loss for the player124
because only a portion r/N < 1 will be repaid. Consequently,125
rational players invest nothing-hence a collective dilemma126
occurs.127
This brief is based on the PGG played in interaction groups128
of size N, consisting of by cooperators, defectors, speculators,129
and loners. To be precise, each participant (except loners) gains130
an equal benefit rcxc (c > 0) which is proportional to the131
fraction of cooperators (xc, 0 ≤ xc ≤ 1) among the players.132
Cooperators pay a fixed cost c to the public goods. Defectors133
contribute nothing, but may be caught and fined by α (α > 0).134
Speculators neither contribute to common goods nor pay a135
fine when caught, instead they pay an amount λ (λ > 0) to136
the insurance policy. Loners obtain a fixed pay-off σ (0 < σ )137
from a solitary pursuit without participating and contributing.138
Assuming for theoretical analysis, from time to time, sam-139
ple groups of N such players are chosen randomly from a140
very large, well-mixed system. Notably, the probability that141
two players in large populations ever encounter again can be142
neglected.143
Within such a group, if Nc (0 ≤ Nc ≤ N) denotes the144
number of cooperators and Nl (0 ≤ Nl ≤ N) is the number of145
loners among the public goods players, the net payoffs of the146




Pc = rcNcN−Nl − c
Pd = rcNcN−Nl − α
Ps = rcNcN−Nl − λ
Pl = σ.
(1) 148
In this game, each unit of investment is multiplied by r (0 < 149
r < N) and the product is distributed among all participants 150
(except loners) irrespective of their strategies. The first term 151
in the expression represents the benefit that the agent obtains 152
from the public goods, while the second term denotes cost. 153
We first derive the probability that n of the N sampled indi- 154
viduals are actually willing to join the public goods game. In 155
the case n = 1 (no co-player shows up) we assume that the 156
player has no other option than to play as a loner, and obtains 157
payoff σ . This happens with probability xN−1l . Here, xl is the 158
fraction of loners. For a given player (C, D or S) willing to 159
join the public goods game, the probability of finding, among 160
the N −1 other players in the sample, n−1 co-players joining 161





(1 − xl)n−1(xl)N−n. (2) 163







xc + xd + xs )
m(
xd + xs
xc + xd + xs )
n−1−m. (3) 165
where xc, xd, xs respectively denote the fractions of coopera- 166
tors, defectors and speculators in the population. 167
For simplicity and without loss of generality, we set the cost 168
c of cooperation equal to 1. In the above case, the payoff for 169
a defector is rm/n−α, while the payoffs for a cooperator and 170
a speculator are respectively specified by r(m + 1)/n − 1 and 171
rm/n − λ. Hence, the expected payoff for a defector in such 172
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m(1 − xc





· (n − 1) xc
1 − xl − α. 175
The payoff of a cooperator in a group of n players is: 176
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· (n − 1) xc
1 − xl − λ. 181
The payoff of a loner is the constant value of σ . 182
Then, the expected payoff for a defector in the population is, 183





· (n − 1) xc






(1 − xl)n−1(xl)N−n 185
= σxN−1l +
rxc
1 − xl [1 −
1 − xNl
N(1 − xl) ] − α(1 − x
N−1
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Fig. 1. The evolution dynamics results of T = (C, D, L), where in the absence
of speculation. (1.1): r < 2−2α. (1.2): r > 2−2α; and (1.3): 1−r/N−α < 0.
Parameters: N = 5, σ = 0.3, and r = 1.6, α = 0.1 for (1.1); r = 3, α = 0.1
for (1.2); r = 3, α = 0.5 for (1.3). Open dots are unstable equilibrium points
and closed dots are stable equilibrium points. Three corners represent a rock-
scissors-paper type heteroclinic cycle if 1 − r/N − α > 0 (cases 1.1 and 1.2)
while full-C is a global attractor if 1 − r/N − α < 0 (case 1.3).
Fig. 2. The evolution dynamics results of T = (C, D, S), where in the
absence of defection. We consider six cases, which are discussed in cases 2.1
till 2.3 in the upper panel of Fig. 2. Fig. 2 focuses on the situation λ−α > 0
implying that the fine for defectors is higher than the costs of cooperation.
Lower panels of Fig. 2 considers the opposite case λ−α < 0, where defection
is the dominating strategy. Results show that there is always a global attractor
in the system, and the outcome of the game dynamics depends on model
parameters. Parameters: N = 5, r = 3, σ = 0.3, and α = 0.1, λ = 0.2 for
(2.1); α = 0.1, λ = 0.8 for (2.2); α = 0.5, λ = 0.8 for (2.3); α = 0.1, λ = 0.2
for (2.4); α = 0.8, λ = 0.5 for (2.5); α = 0.8, λ = 0.1 for (2.6).
In the continuous time model, the evolution of the fractions187
of the four strategies proceeds according to188
x˙i = xi(Pi − P¯), (5)189
where i can be c, d, s, l, Pi is the payoff of strategy i, and190
P¯ = xcPc + xdPd + xsPs + xlσ .191
III. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS192
We firstly focus on the replicator dynamics starting from193
a three-strategy state in the population, then we pay atten-194
tion to analyzing the output when all the four strategies195
initially exist in the population. For the replicator dynamics196
of three-strategy evolution, we comprehensively consider four197
scenarios depicted in Figs. 1-4 as follows. The advantage of198
one strategy over another depends on the payoff difference199
between them, hence200















1 − xl , (6)202









= (λ − α)(1 − xN−1l ), (7)204
Fig. 3. The evolution dynamics results of T = (C, S, L), where in the absence
of speculation. (3.1): r < 2−2λ. (3.2): r > 2−2λ; and (3.3): 1−r/N−λ < 0.
Parameters: N = 5, σ = 0.3, and r = 1.6, λ = 0.1 for (3.1); r = 3, λ = 0.1
for (3.2); r = 3, λ = 0.5 for (3.3). Three corners here represent a rock-
scissors-paper type heteroclinic cycle if 1 − r/N − λ > 0 (cases 3.1 and 3.2)
while pure cooperation is a global attractor if 1 − r/N − λ < 0 (case 3.3).
Fig. 4. The evolution dynamics results of T = (D, L, S) where in the absence
of cooperation.(4.1) resulting game dynamics in the absence of speculation,
where pure loners is the only global attractor in the system. Parameters: N = 5,
r = 3, σ = 0.3, and α = 0.4, λ = 0.1 for (3); α = 0.4, λ = 0.1 for (4.1);
α = 0.1, λ = 0.4 for (4.2).




1 − xl . (8) 205
In the above calculations, N > 1, 1 < r < N and α > 0. The 206
sign of Pi − Pj in fact determines whether it pays to switch 207
from cooperation to defection or vice versa, Pi −Pj = 0 being 208
the equilibrium condition, where i, j can be strategy C, D, S, 209
and L. 210
We now proceed to the study of evolutionary dynamics 211
when λ = α where four strategies coexist in the population; 212
the point in the phase space corresponding to such a state is, 213
referred to as an interior point. We make the following three 214
assumptions and want to show the results that at least one 215
strategy will become extinct with the evolution of the system 216
initialized from an interior point. 217
Theorem 1: If λ = α, at least one strategy will become 218
extinct with the evolution of the system initialized from an 219
interior point. Here, an interior point means that the fraction 220
of every strategy is larger than zero. 221
Proof: We now analyze the system in different situations. 222
(1) When λ = α, supposing λ > α (i.e., Pd > Ps), when 223
xl = 0. We suppose that there is a closed set, meaning that the 224
subsequent evolving state of each initial state in this set also 225
belongs to this set. So xc > 0, xd > 0, xs > 0 and xl > 0 in 226
this closed set. 227
(1.1) We first take one point (x∗c , x∗d, x∗s , x∗l ) in this closed 228
set such that x∗c > 0, x∗d > 0, x∗s > 0, x∗c > 0, and x˙∗c = x˙∗d = 229
x˙∗s = x˙∗l = 0, thus 230
{
x˙∗d = x∗d(p∗d − p¯∗)
x˙∗s = x∗s (p∗s − p¯∗).
(9) 231
Herein, the result x˙∗d = x˙∗s = 0 needs p˙∗d = p¯∗ = p˙∗s , which 232
contradicts with p˙∗d − p˙∗s > 0. Therefore we can safely get the 233
conclusion that there is no interior stable point. 234
(1.2) We next assume that the interior domain is a limit 235
cycle. In this case, the four strategy players will gain the 236
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where p¯c = p¯d = p¯s = p¯l. However, p¯d = p¯s contradicts with238
pd > ps, indicating that the closed set is not a limit cycle.239
(1.3) We then verify whether the interior domain contains240
chaotic solutions, where also xc > 0, xd > 0, xs > 0, xl > 0.241
By introducing the fraction of defections in a population242
consisting of defectors and speculators, f = xd
xd+xs , thus243
f˙ = ( xd
xd + xs )
′ = x˙dxs − xdx˙s
(xd + xs)2 =
xdxs(pd − ps)
(xd + xs)2 > 0. (10)244
Then, limt→∞( xdxd+xs ) = 1 and xs → 0.245
The above mentioned results suggest that, when λ > α there246
is no such a closed set, in which the evolving state of each247
initial state which consist of these four strategies in this set248
also belongs to this set.249
(2) When λ < α and according to the results in (1), there250
is no internal domain.251
(3) When λ = α and thus pd = ps, the four-strategy system252
was reduced to the simplex T = (C, D, L) or T = (C, S, L).253
We will discuss this situation in the following.254
Summing up the above dynamics, we can safely get the255
following conclusions: λ = α reduce the system to a three-256
strategy game, and λ = α will lead to the distinction of at257
least one strategy.258
A. Scenario 1: The Corners of the Simplex T = (C, D, L)259
Theorem 2: If r > 2 − 2α holds, there exists a threshold260
value of xl in the interval (0, 1), above which Pd − Pc < 0.261
Proof: Here, we employ the function G(xl) = (1− xl)(Pd −262
Pc) which has the same roots as Pd − Pc. For xl ∈ (0, 1),263
G(xl) = (1 − xl)(Pd − Pc)264
= (1 − r
N
− α) − (1 − α)xl + (r − 1 + α)xN−1l265
+ ( r
N
+ 1 − α − r)xNl , (11)266
G′(xl) = (α − 1) + (N − 1)(r − 1 + α)xN−2l267
+ N( r
N
+ 1 − α − r)xN−1l . (12)268
Note that G(1) = G′(1) = 0,269
G′′(1) = (N − 1)(N − 2)(r − 1 + α)xN−3l270
+ N(N − 1)( r
N
+ 1 − α − r)xN−2l , (13)271
G′′(1) = (N − 1)(2 − 2α − r). (14)272
We have273
G(xl) 




(N − 1)(2 − 2α − r)(1 − xl)2. (15)275
For r > 2 − 2α, limxl→1− G(xl) < 0,276
G′′(xl) = xN−3l (N − 1)[(N − 2)(r − 1 − α)277
+ xl(r + N − Nα − Nr). (16)278
Since G′′(xl) changes sign at most once in the interval (0, 1),279
we claim that there exists a threshold value of xl in the interval280
(0, 1), above which Pd − Pc < 0.281
From the above analysis, we get282
{ G(xl) = (1 − xl)(Pd − Pc)
G(0) = 1 − rN − α
G(1) = 0.
(17)283
As illustrated in Fig. 1, the game dynamics takes on 284
three qualitatively different cases, which will be discussed as 285
follows. 286
Case 1.1 (1 − r/N − α > 0, i.e., G(0) > 0): 287
lim
xl→1−
G(xl) = 12 (N − 1)(2 − 2α − r)(1 − xl)
2. (18) 288
When r < 2 − 2α, G(xl) > 0, xl ∈ (0, 1), the three cor- 289
ners represent a rock-scissors-paper type heteroclinic cycle, 290
and there is no stable equilibrium of the game dynamics in 291
this case. 292
Case 1.2 (1 − r/N − α > 0, r > 2 − 2α, G(1−) > 0): 293
the three corners represent a heteroclinic cycle. It is a center 294
surrounded by closed orbits. Being similar to case 1.1, there 295
is no stable equilibrium of the game dynamics in this case. 296
Case 1.3 (1 − r/N − α < 0, i.e., r > 2 − 2α): In this case, 297
for all xs, pure speculation (S) and pure defection (D) are both 298
unstable equilibria of the game dynamics. The cooperation 299
equilibrium (C) is stable and in fact a global attractor. 300
Summarizing the three cases in this scenario corresponding 301
to the simplex T = (C, D, L), we can conclude that the three 302
corners represent a rock-scissors-paper type heteroclinic cycle 303
if 1− r/N −α > 0 (cases 1.1 and 1.2) while pure cooperation 304
is a global attractor if 1 − r/N − α < 0 (case 1.3). 305
Proposition 1: When T = (C, D, L), under the replicator 306
dynamics of (6.5), it holds that 307
if 1 − r/N − α > 0 and r < 2 − 2α, there is no inner fixed 308
point in T; 309
if 1 − r/N −α > 0 and r > 2 − 2α, there is one inner fixed 310
point in T; 311
if 1 − r/N − α < 0, full-C is only stable fixed point in T . 312
Proof: When r > 2−2α, there exists a fixed point xl ∈ (0, 1) 313
that Pd = Pc. Since we can get the only xc and xd = 1−xl−xc, 314
hence there is one inner fixed point in T . If 1 − r/N − α > 0 315
and r < 2 − 2α, Pd > Pc for all xl ∈ (0, 1), so there is no 316
fixed point in T . If 1 − r/N − α < 0, we have r > 2 − 2α, 317
(N > 2). Then it must be true that Pc > Pd, so full-C is only 318
stable fixed point in T . 319




Pd − Pc = 1 − α − rN
Pd − Ps = λ − α
Pc − Ps = λ + rN − 1.
(19) 321
Case 2.1 (λ−α > 0, 1−α−r/N > 0 and 1−λ−r/N > 0): 322
Here, pure cooperation and pure speculation are both unstable 323
equilibria of the game dynamics. Full defection equilibrium 324
(D) is stable and in fact a global attractor. 325
Case 2.2 (λ−α > 0, 1−α−r/N > 0 and 1−λ−r/N < 0): 326
In this case, pure cooperation and pure speculation are both 327
unstable equilibria of the game dynamics. Pure defection equi- 328
librium (D) is stable and a global attractor. The difference 329
between case 2.1 and case 2.2 is that when there are only 330
cooperators and speculators in the population, pure coopera- 331
tion is the attractor in case 2.2 while pure speculation is the 332
attractor in case 2.1. 333
Case 2.3 (λ−α > 0, 1−α−r/N < 0, and 1−λ−r/N < 0): 334
Herein, pure defection and pure speculation are both unstable 335
equilibria of the game dynamics. Pure cooperation is a stable 336
and global attractor. 337
Case 2.4 (λ−α < 0, 1−α−r/N > 0, and 1−λ−r/N > 0): 338
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Case 2.5 (λ−α < 0, 1−α−r/N < 0, and 1−λ−r/N < 0):341
Pure cooperation is thus the only stable and global attractor.342
Case 2.6 (λ−α < 0, 1−α−r/N < 0, and 1−λ−r/N > 0):343
Pure speculation is the only stable and global attractor. The344
difference between case 2.6 and 2.4 is that when the population345
consists of only cooperators and defectors, pure cooperation346
is the attractor in case 2.6 while pure defection is the attractor347
in case 2.4.348
Proposition 2: When T = (C, D, S), under the adopted349
replicator dynamics, it holds that350
if λ − α > 0 and 1 − α − r/N > 0: full-D is only stable351
fixed point in T;352
if 1 − α − r/N < 0 and 1 − λ − r/N < 0: full-C is only353
stable fixed point in T;354
if λ − α < 0 and 1 − λ − r/N >: full-S is only stable fixed355
point in T;356
Proof: When xl = 0, if 1 − α − r/N > 0, Pd > Pc; if357
λ − α > 0, Pd > Ps, therefore if xd > 0, Pd > P¯. That means358
full-D (xd = 1) is only stable fixed point in T . When xl = 0,359
if 1 − α − r/N <, Pc > Pd; if 1 − λ − r/N < 0, Pc > Ps,360
therefore if xc > 0, Pc > P¯. That means full-C (xc = 1) is361
only stable fixed point in T . When xl = 0, if λ − α < 0,362
Ps > Pd; if 1 − λ − r/N > 0, Ps > Pc, therefore if xs > 0,363
Ps > P¯. That means full-S (xs = 1) is only stable fixed point364
in T .365
C. Scenario 3: The Corners of the Simplex T = (C, L, S)366
It is easily observed that xl = 0 leads to Pc−Ps = λ−1 < 0.367
Thus, the three corners represent a rock-scissors-paper type368
heteroclinic cycle. There is no stable equilibrium in this case.369
Proposition 3: When T = (C, S, L), under the adopted370
replicator dynamics, it holds that if 1 − r/N − λ > 0 and371
r < 2−2λ, there is no inner fixed point in T; if 1−r/N−λ > 0372
and r > 2 − 2λ, there is one inner fixed point in T; if373
1 − r/N − λ < 0, full C is only stable fixed point in T .374
Proof: By using λ takes the place of α, we can get the375
similar results with proposition 1.3.376
D. Scenario 4: The Corners of the Simplex T = (D, L, S)377
Case 4.1 (λ − α < 0): In this case, pure loners is the only378
stable and in fact the only global attractor.379
Case 4.2 (λ−α > 0): Still, pure loners remains the only sta-380
ble and in fact the only global attractor. The difference between381
case 4.1 and 4.2 is that when there are only speculators and382
defectors in the population, pure speculation is the attractor in383
case 4.1 while pure defection is the attractor in case 4.2.384
Summarizing the two cases in scenario 4 corresponding to385
the simplex T = (C, D, S), we can conclude that pure-L is the386
only global attractor in the system.387
Proposition 4: When T = (S, D, L), under the replicator388
dynamics of (6.5), it holds that full-L is only stable fixed point389
in T .390
Proof: When xc = 0, Pl −Pd = (α+σ)(1−NN−1l ) > 0 and391
Pl − Ps = (λ + σ)(1 − NN−1l ) > 0, therefore full-L (xl = 1) is392
only stable fixed point in T .393
IV. CONCLUSION394
How to effectively coordinate the cooperation between395
agents with conflicts of interest is a hot topic, and its solu-396
tions can be applied to a wide range of applications. For such a397
biology-inspired topic, only when individual heterogeneity and398
diversity are taken into account in theoretical modeling can the399
core of the problem be better addressed. In the face of possi- 400
ble punishment and loss of benefits, the individual’s strategy 401
choices show diversity. Here, we extend the theoretical anal- 402
ysis to a model in which four strategies coexist, and they are 403
respectively derived from actual behaviors in real world. A the- 404
oretical explanation about the evolutionary fate of the system 405
is provided. An interesting future direction would be to address 406
whether the presence of more strategy options altogether affect 407
the dynamics of behaviors in multi-agent systems. 408
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